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variances, otherwise correlations does not play any role in capital allocation results.
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the most popular risk measures: Value at Risk and Expectation Shortfall.
Keywords: Risk, Risk management, Optimal Capital Allocations, Allocation Principles,
Value-at-Risk, Expected Shortfall
MSC2000: 62P05, 62P20, 68N15.
1
Notation
E(·) Expected Value operator.
Xi Random variables with finite mean representing individual losses.
S Aggregate loss defined as
∑N
i=1Xi.
ρ(·) A mapping function representing a risk measure.
Ki Non-negative real numbers representing individual capital to be allocated to the i-th
business unit, i = 1, . . . , N.
K Aggregate capital to be split into Ki individual parts based on different forms of ρ(·).
VaR Value at Risk.
ES Expected Shorfall.
CTE Conditional Tail Expectation.
r.v. Random variable.
Γ A real-valued random variable defined on a probability space (Ω,F ,P).
Ω Sample space.
F Set of all possible events (a σ-algebra).
P Probability.
inf Infimum.
p Probability such that p ∈ (0, 1).
FXi(x) Probability distribution function of a r.v. X defined as P(Xi ≤ x).
F−1Xi (p) Inverse of the distribution function, it is called the quantile function.
Φ Standard normal distribution function.
Φ−1(p) The p-th quantile of Φ.
φ Density of a standard normal distribution.
µ Expected value of a r.v.
V ar(·) Variance of a r.v.
σ2 Variance of a r.v.
σ Standard deviation of a r.v.
Cov(x, y) Covariance between two r.v.’s.
tυ Distribution function of a standard t with υ degrees of freedom.
t−1υ (p) The p-th quantile of tυ.
gυ(·) Density of a standard t-distribution with υ degrees of freedom.
I(·) Indicator function that takes the value 1 if condition in (·) is met, and takes the
value zero otherwise.
υi Measure of risk exposure.
ζi Deviations of the losses from their respective allocated capital levels Ki.
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1 Introduction
Risk management, among other tasks, evaluates the total capital requirements of a company and
allocates it to its various business units. A natural question is: how should a given a mount of
capital be allocated among the different business lines belonging to a company? To accomplish
this, several allocation principles have been developed in the literature, most of them are based
on risk measures sourced either by internal or external factors of the company.
Companies wish to allocate capital to their business units for solvency reasons, i.e. banks
and insurance companies are legally required to set aside some amount of capital in order to
remain solvent. Also capital allocation can be a useful tool for performance measurement and
designing incentives schemes as managers’ performance can be assessed by the amount of capital
allocated to their business units. Profit-and-loss analysis under loan pricing context and under
general investment purposes are another reasons that motivate companies to carry out capital
allocations.
Covering risks by allocating capital is the target of this thesis1 and the main problem to be
solved is the so-called allocation problem. Based on the general framework proposed by Dhaene
et al. (2012) we provide explicit formulations for the proportion of capitals the manager should
allocate on different risk sources based on a wide variety of risk measures.
In this thesis we are particularly interested in providing the exact functional forms of each
allocation principle and also paying carefully attention to the numerical part, we analyse the
“correlation effect” on the allocation principles. Correlation effect is considered to be the effect
of changes in the allocated capital suggested by each principle when changing the correlation
between the losses.
Our findings suggest that correlation effect does not play any role when losses are characterized
by the same two distributional moments (mean and variance), nevertheless when variances differ
while means remain the same some important differences arise when correlation goes from 0 to 1
leading to a clear correlation effect.
This thesis has entirely developed an R package, which has been called OCA package. This
package computes Optimal Capital Allocations (OCA) based on some standard principles such
as Haircut, Overbeck type II and the Covariance Allocation Principle. Also it provides some
short-cuts for obtaining two of the most popular risk measures: Value at Risk and Expectation
Shortfall.
The remainder of this thesis is arranged as follows: section 2 discusses formally what the
allocation problem is, section 3 characterizes coherent risk measures by providing its properties,
then section 4 presents some well-know risk measures. Allocation principles are presented in
section 5 while the general framework for capital allocation, based on Dhaene et al. (2012), is
discussed in section 6. Numerical applications and simulations are reported in section 7 and
section 8. Some concluding remarks are in section 9. The manual for OCA package as well as the
R codes for reproducibility of this work are presented in section 10.
1Note that capital allocation is the purpose of this work and we do not attempt going into details on how to
determine the economic capital to be allocated. We assume this capital is known and given, we are after a way
to determine the optimal proportions of this given capital for allocating them among different risk sources of the
enterprise.
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2 The Allocation Problem
Capital Allocation is a term referring to the subdivision of the aggregate capital held by the
firm across its various constituents, for example, business lines, type of exposure, territories, or
even individual products in a portfolio of insurance policies. This capital is often referred to
as Economic Capital (EC) and is defined as the p-quantile of the loss distribution minus the
expected value of the of loss distribution (Overbeck, 2000), formally this is:
EC(p) = F−1Xi (p)− E(S) with,
F−1S (p) = inf{x ∈ R | FS(s) ≥ p}, p ∈ (0, 1).
Since this definition of EC(P ) does not account for “bad times” episodes, then it is viewed as
an “all or nothing” rule for capital definition. An alternative definition, according to Overbeck
(2000), tries to incorporate such “bad times” in its formulation and treat it as a more “optimistic”
event, this definition states that EC must be:
ECK = E(S|S > K),
where this definition considers Economic Capital in average also enough to cushion losses even in
bad times. Note that capital allocations in subsubsection 6.2.2 are based on this capital definition.
Once the capital is defined, we have to define its counterpart, the loss. Consider a portfolio
of n individual losses (random variables) X1, X2, . . . , Xn materializing at a fixed future date T .
Assume that (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) is a random vector on the probability space (Ω,F ,P). Throughout
this thesis, we will always assume that any loss Xi has a finite mean. The distribution function
P(Xi ≤ x) of Xi will be denoted by FXi(x).
The aggregate loss is defined by the sum of the individual losses:
S =
n∑
i=1
Xi, (1)
where this aggregate loss can be interpreted as:
1. the total loss of a corporation, for example, an insurance company, with the individual
losses corresponding to the losses of the respective business unit,
2. the loss from an insurance portfolio, with the individual losses being those arising from the
different policies; or
3. the loss by a financial conglomerate, white the different individual losses correspond to the
losses suffered by its subsidiaries.
Following Dhaene et al. (2012) it is the first of these interpretations we will use throughout
this thesis.
Hence, S is the aggregate loss faced by an insurance company and Xi is the loss of business
unit i.
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In order to clarify what the allocation problem is, one can view the problem from another
perspective, namely, consider an investor who can invest in a fixed set of n different invest-
ment possibilities with losses represented by the random variables X1, X2, . . . , Xn. We have the
following economic interpretations depending on the area of application (McNeil et al., 2005):
1. Performance measurement. Here the investor is a financial institution and the Xi
represent the Profit-and-Loss distribution of n different lines of business.
2. Loan pricing. In this situation the investor is a loan book manager responsible for a
portfolio of n loans.
3. General investment. Here we consider either an individual or institutional investor and
the standard interpretation of Xi are profit-and-loss corresponding to a set of investments
in various assets.
S is random, so usually we assume that the company has already determined the aggregate
level of capital safely to face those losses and denote this total risk capital by K. The company
now wishes to allocate this exogenously given total risk capital K across its various business
units, that is, to determine non-negative real numbers K1, . . . ,Kn satisfying the full allocation
requirement:
n∑
i=1
Ki = K. (2)
This allocation is in some sense a notional exercise; it does not mean that capital is physically
shifted across the various units, as the company’s assets and liabilities continue to be pooled.
The allocation exercise could be made in order to rank the business units according to levels
of profitability. This task can be performed, for example, by determining the returns on the
allocated capital for the respective business units.
The general approach of capital allocation raises the question of what the appropriate risk
capital for an individual investment opportunity might be. Thus the question of performance of
the investment is intimately connected with the risk measurement chosen. A two-step procedure
is used in practice (McNeil et al., 2005).
1. Compute the overall risk capital ρ(S), where S is defined in Equation 1 and ρ is a particular
risk measurement such as VaR or ES (see section 4 for detailed explanation on these and
other measures). Coherent measures will be more appropriate than non-coherent ones2
2. Compute K as ρ(S) and allocate the capital K to the individual investment possibilities
according to some mathematical capital allocation principle such that, if (Ki) denotes the
capital allocated to the investment with potential loss Xi. The sum of Ki fulfils the re-
quirement in Equation 2.
2See section 3 for a definition of what a coherent measure implies.
7
Throughout this study we are interested in the second step of the procedure pointed out above;
roughly speaking we require a mapping that takes as input the individual losses X1, X2, . . . , Xn
and the risk measure ρ and yields as output the vector (K1,K2, . . . ,Kn) such that:
ρ(S) =
n∑
i=1
Ki = K. (3)
Such a mapping will be called a capital allocation principle. The relation Equation 3 is
sometimes called the full allocation property (McNeil et al., 2005) since all of the overall risk
capital ρ(S) (not more, not less) is allocated to the investment possibilities; McNeil et al. (2005)
consider this property to be an integral part of the definition of an allocation principle.
Given that a capital allocation can be carried out in a countless number of ways, additional
criteria must be set up in order to determine the most suitable. A reasonable start is to require the
allocated capital amounts Ki to be “close” to their corresponding losses Xi in some appropriately
defined sense. This underlies the approach proposed in the present thesis. Prior to introducing
the idea of “closeness” between individual loss and allocated capital, we revisit some well-known
capital allocation methods. But before going into capital allocation methods it is worth to discuss
about what a coherent risk measure is.
3 Coherent Risk Measures: Definition and Properties
A risk measure is a mapping ρ from a set Γ of real-valued random variables defined on a probability
space (Ω,F ,P) to the real line R:
ρ : Γ→ R : X ∈ Γ→ ρ[X]. (4)
The random variable X refers to the loss associated with conducting a business and ρ[X]
represents the amount of capital to be set aside in order to make the loss X an acceptable risk.
Some well-know properties that risk measures may or may not satisfy are law invariance,
monotonicity, positive homogeneity, translation invariance (or equivalence), and subadditivity,
these axioms were proposed for applications in financial risk management in the seminal paper
by Artzner et al. (1999). These axioms are formally defined as:
1. Law invariance: For any X1, X2 ∈ Γ with P[X1 ≤ x] = P[X2 ≤ x] for all x ∈ R, ρ[X1] =
ρ[X2]
2. Subadditivity : For any X1, X2 ∈ Γ, ρ[X1 +X2] ≤ ρ[X1] + ρ[X1]
The rational behind this is summarized by Artzner et al. (1999) in the statement that “a
merger does not create extra risk”. McNeil et al. (2005) refer to subadditivity as the most
debated of the axioms for a risk measure to be considered coherent,3 but also they provide
some reasons why this axiom is indeed a reasonable requirement:
• Subadditivity reflects the idea that risk can be reduced by diversification, a time-
honoured in finance and economics.
3“probably because it rules out VaR as a risk measure in certain situations” (McNeil et al., 2005, p.239)
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• If a regulator uses a non-subadditive risk measure in determining the regulatory capi-
tal for a financial institution, that institution has an incentive to legally break up into
various subsidiaries in order to reduce its regulatory capital requirements. Similarly,
if the risk measure used by an organized exchange in determining the margin require-
ments of investors is non-subadditive, an investor could reduce the margin he has to
pay by opening a different account for every position in his portfolio.
• Subadditivity makes decentralization of risk-management system possible. Consider
as an example two trading desks with portfolios leading to losses X1 and X2. Imagine
that a risk manager wants to ensure that ρ(X), the risk of the overall loss X = X1+X2
is smaller than some number M . If he uses a risk measure ρ, which is subadditive,
he may simply choose bounds M1 and M2 such that M1 + M2 ≤ M and impose on
each of the desks ths constraint that ρ(Xi) ≤ Mi; subadditivity of ρ then ensures
automatically that ρ(X) ≤M1 +M2 ≤M .
3. Positive homogeneity : For any X ∈ Γ and a > 0, ρ[aX] = aρ[X].
This axiom is easily justified if we assume that Subadditivity holds. Subadditivity implies
that, for n ∈ N,
ρ(nX) = ρ(X + . . .+X) ≤ nρ(X). (5)
Since there is no netting or diversification between the losses in this portfolio, it is natural
to require that equality should hold in Equation 5, which leads to positive homogeneity.
4. Monotonicity : For any X1, X2 ∈ Γ, X1 ≤ X2 implies ρ[X1] ≤ ρ[X2].
From an economic point of view this axiom is obvious: positions that lead to higher losses
in every state of the world require more risk capital.
For a risk measure satisfying Axioms 2 and 4, the Monotonicity axiom is equivalent to
the requirement that ρ(X) ≤ 0 for all X ≤ 0. To see this, observe that monotonicity
implies that if X ≤ 0, then ρ(X) ≤ ρ(0) = 0; the latter equality follows from Axiom 4
since ρ(0) = ρ(λ0) = λρ(0) for all λ > 0. Conversely, if X1 ≤ X2 and we assume that
ρ(X1 −X2) ≤ 0, then ρ(X1) = ρ(X1 −X2 +X2) ≤ ρ(X1 −X2) + ρ(X2) by Axiom 2 which
implies that ρ(X1) ≤ ρ(X2)
5. Translation invariance: For any X1, X2 ∈ Γ and b ∈ R, ρ[X + b] = ρ[X] + b Axiom 5 states
that by adding or subtracting a deterministic quantity b to a position leading to the loss X
we alter our capital requirement by exactly that amount. The axiom is in fact necessary
for the risk-capital interpretation of ρ to make sense. Consider a position with loss X and
ρ(X) > 0. Adding the amount of capital ρ(b) to the position leads to the adjusted loss
X˜ = X − ρ(X), with X˜ = ρ(X)− ρ(X) = 0, so that the position X˜ is acceptable without
further injection of capital.
4 Some Known Risk Measures
This section is intended to briefly define two well-known risk measures: Value-at-Risk (VaR) and
Conditional Tail Expectation (CTE) each of them constructed under the normality assumption
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of the vector of losses and on assuming a t-student distribution with υ degrees of freedom.
4.1 Value at Risk (VaR)
Value at Risk (VaR) is probably the most widely used risk measure in financial institutions
(McNeil et al., 2005) and has also made its way into the Basel II capital-adequacy framework.
Definition 1 Value at Risk: For a given probability level p ∈ (0, 1), following Dhaene et al.
(2012), we denote the VaR or quantile of the loss random variable X by F−1X (p)
4. As usual, it is
defined by
F−1X (p) = inf{x ∈ R | FX(x) ≥ p}, p ∈ (0, 1) (6)
whith inf{∅} = +∞ by convention.
In probabilistic terms, VaR is thus simply a quantile of the loss distribution. Typical values
for p are p = 0.95 or p = 0.99 (McNeil et al., 2005).
One important aspect the reader must to take into account, from Definition 1 is that losses
will be considered as a positive value, hence if Xi > 0 it is a loss, otherwise it is not.
4.1.1 VaR for normal and t loss distributions
Since Gaussian and t-student distributions are the most popular to assess risks we provide some
explicit expressions for risk measures assuming either a normal or a t-student distribution with
υ degrees of freedom.
Suppose that the loss distribution FX is normal with mean µ and variance σ2. Fix p ∈ (0, 1).
Then
V aRp = µ+ σΦ
−1(p), (7)
where Φ denotes the standard normal distribution function and the Φ−1(p) is the p-quantile
of Φ. A proof of this result can be found in (McNeil et al., 2005, p.39-40)
A similar result is obtained for any location-scale family and another useful example is the
Student t loss distribution. Suppose our lossX is such that (X−µ)/σ has a standard t distribution
with υ degrees of freedom; following McNeil et al. (2005) we also denote this model by X ∼
t(υ, µ, σ2) and note that the moments are given by E(X) = µ and var(X) = υσ/(υ − 2) when
υ > 2, so that σ is not the standard deviation of the distribution. We get
V aRp = µ+ σt
−1
υ (p), (8)
where t−1υ (p) denotes the p-th quantile function of standard t with υ degrees of freedom.
In spite of the fact that VaR is quite intuitive and yet elegant risk measure it has its own
Achilles’ heel since Artzner et al. (1999) do not consider it to be a coherent risk measure due to
VaR is not a subadditivity measure, as mentioned in McNeil et al. (2005):
4F−1X (p) is the quantile function which is defined as the inverse of the Distribution Function FX .
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“VaR has been fundamentally criticized as a risk measure on the grounds that is
has poor aggregation properties. This critique has its origins in the work of Artzner
et al. (1999), who showed that VaR is not a coherent risk measure, since it violates
the property of subadditivity that they believe reasonable risk measure should have.”
4.2 Conditional Tail Expectation (CTE)
Conditional Tail Expectation (CTE) is also known as the Expected Shorfall (ES) which is closely
related to VaR, we will be using either one or other the term interchangeably. Note that for
non-continuous random variables these concepts are not equivalent, see Denuit et al. (2005).
Definition 2 Conditional Tail Expectation: For a loss X with E(|X|) <∞ and distribution
function denoted by FX the expected shortfall at confidence level p ∈ (0, 1) is defined as:
ESp =
1
1− p
∫ 1
p
qu(FX)du, (9)
where qu(FX) = F←X (u) is the quantile function of FX .
Expected shortfall is thus related to VaR by
ESp =
1
1− p
∫ 1
p
V aRu(X)du = E[X|X > F−1X (p)].
The meaning of ES is the following: instead of fixing a particular confidence level p we
average VaR over all levels u ≥ p and thus we “look further into the tail” of the loss distribution.
Furthermore, ES can be interpreted as the expected loss that is incurred in the event that VaR
is exceeded.
Another important relationship is ESp ≥ V aRp; This follows from averaging all the losses
without fixing any confidence level for the ES as we already pointed out before, since VaR requires
the confidence to be fixed is always smaller than the Conditional Tail Expectation.
One clear advantage that CTE has over VaR is that CTE is a subadditive risk measure under
continuous distributions for losses5 (Acerbi and Tasche, 2002; Dhaene et al., 2006). CTE meet all
axioms described in section 3 that is the reason why McNeil et al. (2005) claims that currently
CTE “is now preferred to VaR by many risk managers in practice”. See proposition 6.9 in (McNeil
et al., 2005, p. 243) for a proof why ES is a coherent risk measure.
In order to provide explicit expressions of ES for the normal and t-student distributions we
have to use the following lemma:
Lemma 1 For an integrable loss X with continuous distribution function, FX and any p ∈ (0, 1)
we have
ESp =
1
1− pE(X : X ≥ qp(X)) = E(X|X ≥ V aRp)
5In general, the CTE as a risk measure does not necessarily satisfy the subadditivity axiom (McNeil et al.,
2005). However, it is known to be a coherent risk measure in case we restrict to random variables with continuous
distribution functions (Acerbi and Tasche, 2002; Dhaene et al., 2006).
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Once Lemma 1 is stated we can rely on it to calculate the ES for two common continuous
distributions. A proof can be found in Dhaene et al. (2012)
4.2.1 CTE for normal and Student t loss distribution
Suppose that the loss distribution FX is normal with mean µ and variance σ2 and we have a fixed
p ∈ (0, 1). Then
ESp = µ+ σ
φ(Φ−1(p))
1− p , (10)
where φ is the density of the standard normal distribution and Φ−1 is the inverse of the normal
distribution function.
Now, suppose that the loss X is such that X˜ = (X −µ)/σ has a standard t-distribution with
υ degrees of freedom. Suppose further that υ > 1, since we have a location-scale family we can
write ESp = µ+ σESp(X˜). The ES of the standard t-distribution is:
ESp(X˜) =
gυ(t
−1
υ (p))
1− p
(
υ + (t−1υ (p))2
υ − 1
)
. (11)
In this last expression gυ is the density of a t-Student distribution with υ degrees of freedom.
5 Allocation Principles
A capital allocation principle is a general rule that assigns a capital K to any given risk S. Firms
want their total capital to be allocated for several reasons as Dhaene et al. (2012) pointed out:
1. There is a need to redistribute the total (frictional or opportunity) cost associated with
holding capital across various business lines so that this cost is equitably transferred back
to the depositors or policyholders in the form of charges.
2. The allocation of expenses across lines of business is a necessary activity for financial re-
porting purposes.
3. Capital allocation provides for a useful device of assessing and comparing the performance
of the different lines of business by determining the return on allocated capital for each line.
Comparing these returns allows one to distinguish the most profitable business lines and hence
may assist in remunerating the business line managers or in making decisions concerning business
expansions, reductions or even eliminations.
Allocation principles are methods aimed to solve the allocation problem by providing capital
to each business unit for them to face their losses. This means that allocation principles gives
those Ki shown in Equation 2 as solution to our main problem.
Risk measures presented in section 4 give rise to some allocation principles:
1. Haircut allocation principle based on VaR.
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2. Conditional Tail Expectation allocation principle, as its name suggests it relies on CTE.
3. Covariance allocation principle.
5.1 Haircut allocation principle
This a is straightforward allocation method consisting of allocating the capitalKi = γF−1Xi (p), i =
1, . . . , n to business unit i, where the factor γ is chosen such that the full allocation requirement
Equation 2 is satisfied. This gives rise to the haircut allocation principle:
Ki =
K
n∑
i=1
F−1Xi (p)
F−1Xi (p), i = 1, . . . , n. (12)
Haircut principle is based on the idea of measuring stand-alone losses using a VaR for a given
(fixed) probability level p that is why it is a very common technique among banks and insurance
companies. It boils down to a principle of single proportionality.
It should be noted that K is exogenously determined, it is considered as a given value. The
capital allocated by this principle does not rely on the structure dependence of the losses Xi of the
different business units. Dhaene et al. (2012) consider haircut as a method which is independent of
the portfolio context within which the individual losses are embedded, clearly this fact highlights
the non-subadditivity property of the VaR.
The two more immediately consequences derived from non-subadditivity in the haircut prin-
ciple context are: i) The portfolios does not benefit from a pooling effect (this is true even
beyond haircut scope) and ii) It may happen that the allocated capitals Ki exceed the respective
stand-alone capitals F−1Xi (p).
5.2 CTE allocation principle (Overbeck type II allocation principle)
CTE principle is based on CTE presented in subsection 4.2, we call this kind of allocation Overbeck
type II allocation principle6 . For a given probability level p ∈ (0, 1), the CTE of the aggregate
loss is defined as:
CTEp[S] = E
[
S|S > F−1XS (p)
]
. (13)
Equation 13 is just a concise version of writing Equation 9 in terms of conditional expectations.
As we pointed out before, at a fixed level p, CTE gives the average of the top (1 − p) percent
losses.
The CTE allocation principle for some fixed probability level p ∈ (0, 1) has the form:
Ki =
K
CTEp[S]
E
[
Xi|S > F−1XS (p)
]
, i = 1, . . . , n. (14)
Unlike the haircut allocation principle, the CTE principle takes into account the dependence
structure of the random losses (X1, X2, . . . , Xn). Interpreting the event S > F−1XS (p) as the “the
6See subsubsection 6.2.2 to find out why we call this principle this way.
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aggregate portfolio loss S is large”, we see from Equation 14 that business units with larger
conditional expected loss, given that the aggregate loss S is large, will be penalized with larger
amount of capital required than those with lesser conditional expected loss.
5.3 Covariance allocation principle
The Covariance allocation principle takes the following form:
Ki =
K
V ar[S]
Cov(Xi, S), i = 1, . . . , n, (15)
where Cov(Xi, S) is the covariance between the individual loss Xi and the aggregate loss S and
V ar(S) is the variance of the aggregate loss. Because clearly the sum of the individual covariances
is equal to the variance of the aggregate loss, the full allocation requirement in Equation 2 is
automatically satisfied in this case.
The Covariance allocation principle as well as the CTE allocation principle takes into account
the dependence structure of the random losses. A nice interpretation arises from the Covariance
principle is “business units with a loss that is more correlated with the aggretate portfolio loss
S are penalized by requiring them to hold a larger amount of capital than those that are less
correlated” (Dhaene et al., 2012) .
5.4 Proportional allocations
McNeil et al. (2005) summarizes all the allocation methods explained in the previous sections into
what they call Proportional Allocations which is a more general class encompassing the allocation
principles described above. Depending on which risk measure ρ is chosen for attributing capital
Ki is the key for obtaining one of them. This idea is formalized as:
Ki = ωρ(Xi), i = 1, . . . , n, (16)
where Ki is the capital to be allocated to each business unit i, ρ(·) is risk measure (preferably a
coherent one) and the factor ω is chosen such that the full allocation requirement in Equation 2
is satisfied, this factor takes the following form:
ω =
K
n∑
i=1
ρ(Xi)
, i = 1, . . . , n. (17)
Equation 17 can be seen as a weighting scheme for capital allocation, substituting Equation 17
into Equation 16 we have an explicit and general formulation encompassing all the allocation
principles discussed above:
Ki =
K
n∑
i=1
ρ(Xi)
ρ(Xi), i = 1, . . . , n. (18)
The allocation principles discussed in the previous subsections follow from Equation 18 by
choosing the appropriate risk measure ρ (McNeil et al., 2005)
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1. Haircut allocation: ρ(Xi) = F−1Xi (p).
2. CTE allocation: ρ(Xi) = E
[
Xi|S > F−1XS (p)
]
.
3. Covariance allocation: ρ(Xi) = Cov(Xi, S).
6 Optimal Capital Allocations
As we have pointed out above, K is considered to be exogenous; because there are several al-
location principles to aggregate capital K to n parts K1, . . . ,Kn corresponding to the different
subportfolios or business units. As one can realize right away such allocation can be carried out
in an infinite number of ways, some of them were illustrated in section 5, at this point Dhaene
et al. (2012) claims that “there seems to be a lack of a clear motivation for preferring to choose
one over another, although it appears obvious that different capital allocations must in some
sense correspond to different questions that can be asked within the context of risk management”
and this is the main focus of the Dhaene et al. (2012) becomes a key reference for systematizing
capital allocation methods by viewing them as solutions to a particular decision problem. In
order to achieve this goal they formulate a decision criterion, such as:
Capital should be allocated such that for each business unit the allocated capital
and the loss are sufficiently close to each other (Dhaene et al., 2012).
In order to cast this statement in a more formal setting, consider the aggregate portfolio
loss S = X1 + . . . + Xn with aggregate capital K. Once the aggregate capital is allocated, the
difference between the aggregate loss and the aggregate capital can be expressed as:
S −K =
n∑
i=1
(Xi −Ki), (19)
where the quantity (Xi −Ki) expresses the loss minus the allocated capital for subportfolio i. It
is important to notice that in this setting, the subportfolios are crosssubsidizing each other, in
the sense that the occurrence of the event “Xk > Kk” does not necessarily lead to “ruin”; such
unfavorable performance of subportfolio k may be compensated by a favorable outcome for one
or more values (Xl −Kl) of the other subportfolios.
Dhaene et al. (2012) propose to determine the appropriate allocation by the following opti-
mization problem:
Definition 3 Optimal Capital Allocation Problem Given the aggregate capital K > 0, de-
termine the allocated capitals Ki, i=1, . . . , n, from the following optimization problem:
min
K1,...,Kn
n∑
i=1
υiE
[
ζiD
(
Xi −Ki
υi
)]
, such that,
n∑
i=1
Ki = K, (20)
where the υi are non-negative real numbers such that
∑n
i=1 υi = 1, the ζi are non-negative random
variables such that E(ζi) = 1, and D is a non-negative function.
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Each of the component in the general optimal capital allocation problem in Equation 20 are
defined as follows:
υi: The non-negative real number υi is a measure of exposure or business volume of the ith
unit, such as revenue, insurance premium, etc. These scalar quantities are chosen such
that they sum to 1. Their inclusion in the expression D
(
Xi −Ki
υi
)
normalizes the devi-
ations of loss from allocated capital across business units to make them relatively more
comparable. At the same time, the υis are used as weights attached to the different values
of E
[
ζiD
(
Xi −Ki
υi
)]
in the minimization problem in Equation 20, in order to reflect the
relative importance of the different business units.
D
(
Xi −Ki
υi
)
: For simplicity, it is first assumed that υi = 1 and also that ζi ≡ 1. The terms
D(Xi −Ki) quantify the deviations of the outcomes of the losses Xi from their allocated
capital Ki. Minimizing the sum of the expectations of these quantities essentially reflects
the requirement that the allocated capitals should be “as close as possible” to the losses
they are allocated to. Examples of distance measures are “squared or quadratic deviations”
and “absolute deviations”.
ζi The deviations of the losses Xi from their respective allocated capital levels Ki are measured
by the terms E [ζiD(Xi −Ki)]. These expectations involve non-negative random variables
ζi with E(ζi) = 1 that are used as weight factors to the different possible outcomes of
D(Xi −Ki). One possible choice for the ζi could be ζi = h(Xi) for some non-negative and
non-decreasing function h. In this case, the heaviest weights are attached to deviations
that correspond to states of the world leading to the largest outcomes of Xi. We will call
allocations based on such a choice for the ζi business unit driven allocations.
Another choice is to let ζi = h(S) for some non-negative and non-decreasing function h, such
that the outcomes of the deviations are weighted with respect to the aggregate portfolio
performance. In this case, heavier weights are attached to deviations that correspond to
states of the world leading to larger outcomes of S. Allocations based on such a choice for
the random variables ζi will be called aggregate portfolio driven allocations.
A yet different approach is to let ζi = ζM for all i, where ζM can be interpreted as the loss
on a reference (or market) portfolio. In this case, the weighting is market driven and the
corresponding allocation is said to be a market-driven allocation.
TheQuadratic Optimization Criterion is proposed by Dhaene et al. (2012) as the General
Solution of the Quadratic Allocation Problem by letting
D(x) = x2. (21)
This leads to Equation 20 to
min
K1,...,Kn
n∑
i=1
E
[
ζi
(Xi −Ki)2
υi
]
, such that,
n∑
i=1
Ki = K. (22)
16
The solution to this minimization problem is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 The optimal allocation problem in Equation 22 has the following unique solution:
Ki = E(ζiXi) + υi
(
K −
n∑
i=1
E(ζiXj)
)
, i = 1, . . . , n. (23)
A detailed proof of the solution for this minimization problem can be found in Dhaene et al.
(2012).
6.1 Business unit driven allocations
Following Dhaene et al. (2012), in this subsection, we consider the case where the weighting
random variables ζi in the quadratic allocation problem in Equation 22 are given by
ζi = hi(Xi), (24)
with hi being a non-negative and non-decreasing function such that E[hi(Xi)] = 1, for i =
1, . . . , n. Hence, for each business unit i, the states of the world to which we want to assign the
heaviest weights are those under which the business unit performs the worst. As earlier pointed
out, we call allocations based on Equation 24 business unit driven allocations. In this case, the
allocation rule in Equation 23 can be rewritten as
Ki = E[Xihi(Xi)] + υi
(
K −
n∑
i=1
E[Xihi(Xi)]
)
, i = 1, . . . , n. (25)
For an exogenously given value of K, the allocations Ki are not influenced by the mutual
dependence structure between the losses Xi of the different business units. In this sense, one can
say that the allocation principle (25) is independent of the portfolio context within which the
Xis are embedded and, hence, is indeed business unit driven. Such allocations might be a useful
instrument for determining the performance bonuses of the business unit managers, in case one
assumes that each manager should be rewarded for the performance of his own business unit but
not extra rewarded (or penalized) for the interrelationship that exists between the performance
of his business unit and that of the other units of the company. One should however note that
disregarding in this way diversification between business units, the allocation may give incentives
to managers that are at odds with overall portfolio optimization criteria.
The law invariant risk measure E[Xihi(Xi)] assigns to any loss Xi the expected value of the
weighted outcomes of this loss, where higher weights correspond to larger outcomes of the loss,
that is, to more adverse scenarios. Risk measures and premium principles of this general type are
proposed and investigated in Heilmann (1989), Tsanakas (2007), and Furman and Zitikis (2008).
Defining the volumes υi by
υi =
E[Xihi(Xi)]∑n
i=1E[Xihi(Xi)]
. (26)
The allocation principle could be found by substituting Equation 26 in Equation 25 and
simplifying the expression as in:
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Ki = E[Xihi(Xi)] +
E[Xihi(Xi)]∑n
i=1E[Xihi(Xi)]
(
K −
n∑
i=1
E[Xihi(Xi)]
)
= E[Xihi(Xi)] +K
E[Xihi(Xi)]∑n
i=1E[Xihi(Xi)]
− E[Xihi(Xi)]
=
E[Xihi(Xi)]
∑n
i=1E[Xihi(Xi)] +KE[Xihi(Xi)]− E[Xihi(Xi)]
∑n
i=1E[Xihi(Xi)]∑n
i=1E[Xihi(Xi)]
.
Now it can be easily seen from this last expression the allocation principle based on the
business unit driven idea is given by:
Ki =
K∑n
i=1E[Xihi(Xi)]
E[Xihi(Xi)]. (27)
Once we got to know the general form of the business unit driven allocation principle we
are now able to choose different forms for hi(Xi) in order to achieve several capital allocation
principles based upon the business unit driven allocation framework, this is exactly the main
purpose of the subsequent sections.
6.1.1 (Pure) Conditional Tail Expectation principle
Once we know the allocation principle for allocating Ki using business unit driven principle we
can set specific forms for hi(Xi), we can obtain several explicitly functional forms for Ki, for
instance by choosing hi(Xi) =
I(Xi>F−1Xi (p))
1−FXi (F−1Xi (p))
, then Ki will result in the (Pure) Conditional Tail
Expectation principle.
We call this principle (Pure) Conditional Tail Expectation because both the aggregate loss
and each individual business unit losses are taken conditional expectation based on the average
of the top (1 − p) loss. Since CTE(·) is applied to S and Xi then we call it (Pure) Conditional
Tail Expectation so that we can distinguish it from the Conditional Tail Expectation principle
based on (Overbeck, 2000) which we call Overbeck type II allocation principle which is a special
case of the Aggregate Portfolio Driven Allocations, see subsection 6.2.
By choosing hi(Xi) =
I(Xi>F−1Xi (p))
1−FXi (F−1Xi (p))
multiplying by Xi and taking expectations will lead us to:
E[Xihi(Xi)] = E
[
Xi
I(Xi > F−1Xi (p))
1− p
]
=
1
1− pE[Xi|Xi > F
−1
Xi
(p)].
From Lemma 1 the previous expressios reduces to the Conditional Tail Expectation:
E[Xihi(Xi)] = CTEp[Xi].
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Now replacing E[Xihi(Xi)] by CTEp[Xi] in Equation 27 we have:
Ki =
K∑n
i=1CTEp(Xi)
CTEp(Xi) =
K
CTEp(
∑n
i=1Xi)
CTEp(Xi).
∑n
i=1CTEp(Xi) = CTEp(
∑n
i=1Xi) follows from the additivity proporty of CTE.
Hence Ki takes the following form:
Ki =
K
CTEp(S)
CTEp(Xi). (28)
6.1.2 Standard deviation principle
The standard deviation principle (Bühlmann, 1970) can be easily obtained by choosing hi(Xi) =
1 + aXi−E(Xi)σXi
, a ≥ 0, so that replacing it into E[Xihi(Xi)] and then plug it into Equation 27
will have the so-called standard deviation principle.
In order to get an expression for Ki based upon the standard deviation principle we proceed
as follows:
E[Xihi(Xi)] = E
[
Xi + a
X2i −XiE(Xi)
σXi
]
= E(Xi) +
a
σXi
{
E(X2i )− [E(Xi)]2
}
= E(Xi) +
a
σXi
σ2Xi
= E(Xi) + aσXi .
For
∑n
i=1E[Xihi(Xi)] to be explicitly found we proceed as follows:
n∑
i=1
E[Xihi(Xi)] =
n∑
i=1
{E(Xi) + aσXi}
=
n∑
i=1
E(Xi) + a
n∑
i=1
σXi . (29)
Equation 29 can be simplified to Equation 30 if and only if Cov(Xi, Xj) = 0 ∀i 6= j
E(S) + aσS , (30)
this follows from the following operations:
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n∑
i=1
E(Xi) + a
n∑
i=1
σXi = E
(
n∑
i=1
Xi
)
+ a
√√√√V ar( n∑
i=1
Xi
)
⇔ Cov(Xi, Xj) = 0 ∀i 6= j
= E(S) + aσS .
Consequently the form taken by Ki based upon the standard deviation principle is:
Ki =
K
E(S) + aσS
(E(Xi) + aσXi) . (31)
A very interesting relationship between Overbeck type I allocation principle which we will be
studied in subsubsection 6.2.2 and the Standard deviation allocation principle, Equation 40 and
Equation 31, respectively, is given by:
Ki =
K
E(S) + aφ
(
E(Xi) +
a
σ
γ
)
. (32)
Overbeck type I is retrieved by Equation 32 when choosing φ = σ2S and γ = Cov(Xi, S), in so
far as the standard deviation principle is recovered when setting φ = σS and γ = Cov(Xi, Xi) =
V ar(Xi) = σ
2
Xi
.
6.1.3 Esscher principle
If we let hi(Xi) be e
aXi
E[eaXi ]
with a > 0 then K will be allocated accordingly by the Esscher
Principle (Gerber, 1981), as we shall see below:
E[Xihi(Xi)] = E
[
Xie
aXi
E[eaXi ]
]
.
n∑
i=1
E[Xihi(Xi)] =
n∑
i=1
E
[
Xie
aXi
E[eaXi ]
]
.
Thus, the optimal Ki will look like as Equation 33:
Ki =
K∑n
i=1E
[
Xie
aXi
E[eaXi ]
]E [XieaXi
E[eaXi ]
]
. (33)
6.2 Aggregate portfolio driven allocations
Unlike from the Business Unit Driven Allocation rule, this time Dhaene et al. (2012) consider
the case where
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Table 1: Business Unit Driven Capital Allocation
Reference hi(Xi) Ki
(Pure) Conditional Tail Ex-
pectation Overbeck (2000)
I(Xi>F−1Xi (p))
1−FXi (F
−1
Xi
(p))
p ∈ (0, 1) K
CTEp(S)
CTEp(Xi)
Standard deviation princi-
ple Bühlmann (1970)7
1 + a
Xi − E(Xi)
σXi
, a ≥ 0 K
E(S) + aσS
(
E(Xi) + aσXi
)
Esscher principle Gerber
(1981)
eaXi
E(eaXi )
, a > 0 Ki =
K∑n
i=1 E
[
Xie
aXi
E[eaXi ]
]E [XieaXi
E[eaXi ]
]
ζi = h(S), i = 1, . . . , n, (34)
with h being a non-negative and non-decreasing function such that E[h(S)] = 1. In this case, the
states of the world to which we assign the heaviest weights are those under which the aggregate
portfolio performs worst. Therefore, we call such allocations aggregate portfolio driven allocations.
The allocation rule (23) can now be rewritten as:
Ki = E[Xih(S)] + υi(K − E[Sh(S)]), i = 1, . . . , n. (35)
Hence, the capital Ki allocated to unit i is determined using a weighted expectation of the
loss Xi, with higher weights attached to states of the world that involve a large aggregate loss S.
Notice that the allocation principle (35) can be reformulated as8
Ki = E(Xi) + Cov[Xi, h(S)] + υi(K − E[Sh(S)]), i = 1, . . . , n. (36)
This means that the capital allocated to the ith business unit is given by the sum of the
expected loss E[Xi], a loading that depends on the covariance between the individual and aggre-
gate losses Xi and h(S), plus a term proportional to the volume of the business unit. A strong
positive correlation between Xi and h(S), which reflects that Xi could be a substantial driver of
the aggregate loss S, produces a higher allocated capital Ki.
Using aggregate portfolio driven allocations might be appropriate when one wants to inves-
tigate each individual portfolio’s contribution to the aggregate loss of the entire company. In
other words, the company wishes to evaluate the subportfolio performances, for example, the
returns on the allocated capitals, in the presence of the other subportfolios. This can provide rel-
evant information to the company within which it can further be used to evaluate either business
expansions or reductions.
Defining the volumes υi by
υi =
E[Xih(S)]
E[Sh(S)]
, i = 1, . . . , n. (37)
Plugging Equation 37 into Equation 35 we have:
8This follows from the fact that Cov(Xi, h(S)) = E(Xih(S)) − E(Xi)E(h(S)) solving for E(Xih(S)) we end
up with E(Xi) + Cov[Xi, h(S)] since E(h(S)) = 1
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Ki = E[Xih(S)] +
E[Xih(S)]
E[Sh(S)]
(K − E[Sh(S)])
= E[Xih(S)] +K
[Xih(S)]
E[Sh(S)]
− E[Xih(S)]
=
E[Xih(S)]E[Sh(S)] +KE[Xih(S)]− E[Xih(S)]E[Sh(S)]
E[Sh(S)]
.
Simplifying this last expression we end up with a proportional allocation rule:
Ki =
K
E[Sh(S)]
E[Xih(S)]. (38)
Using the proportional allocation principle shown in Equation 38 and choosing some structure
for h(S) one can be allowed to construct several ways for allocatingK. For instance let us consider
a particular choice for h(S) to be h(S) = S−E(S) this yields to the covariance allocation principle
introduced in section 5 by means of determining the expression for both E[Xih(S)] and E[Sh(S)]
and then plug them into Equation 38 as it is shown below.
6.2.1 Covariance allocation principle
This subsection is intended to derive the Covariance allocation principle from the general setting
presented in the previous section by setting h(S) = S − E(S) and using the philosophy of the
plug-in principle.
Setting h(S) = S − E(S) the aim is to determine E[Xih(S)] and E[Sh(S)].
For E[Xih(S)] the way to go is:
E[Xih(S)] = E[XiS − E(S)]
= E[XiS −XiE(S)]
= E(XiS)− E(Xi)E(S)
= Cov(Xi, S).
For E[Sh(S)] to be explicitly found we proceed as follows:
E[Sh(S)] = E[S(S − E(S))]
= E[S2 − SE(S)]
= E(S2)− E(S)E(S)
= E(S2)− [E(S)]2
= V ar(S).
Once we have the expressions for E[Xih(S)] and E[Sh(S)] we can now plug them into Equa-
tion 38 in order to have the expression for allocating capital K among the different business units
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(Xi with i = 1, . . . , n) based on the Aggregate Portfolio Driven idea. So the allocation principle
has the form:
Ki =
K
V ar[S]
Cov(Xi, S), i = 1, . . . , n. (39)
Precisely this is exactly the expression shown in Equation 15 from this fact one can notice
that Covariance Principle is a special case of the Aggregate Portfolio Driven Allocation when
choosing h(S) = S − E(S).
6.2.2 Overbeck allocation principles
Within this subsection we provide an explicit expression for the Aggregate Portfolio Driven Al-
location principle based on Overbeck (2000). We call Overbeck Type I allocation principle to the
principle obtained by setting h(S) = 1 + aS−E(S)σS , a ≥ 0. And we will call Overbeck Type II
allocation principle to that when using h(S) = 11−pI(S > F
−1
S (p)), with p ∈ (0, 1).
As in the previous sections we now proceed to find an explicit expression for Ki by setting
h(S) = 1 + aS−E(S)σS , a ≥ 0.
For E[Xih(S)] we have:
E[Xih(S)] = E
[
Xi
(
1 + a
S − E(S)
σS
)]
= E
[
XiσS + aXi − aXiE(S)
σS
]
=
1
σS
E [XiσS + aXi − aXiE(S)]
= E(Xi) +
a
σS
E(XiS)− a
σS
E(Xi)E(S)
= E(Xi) +
a
σS
[E(XiS)− E(Xi)E(S)]
= E(Xi) +
a
σS
Cov(Xi, S).
Working a little on E[Sh(S)] we find:
E[Sh(S)] = E
[
S +
aS(S − E(S))
σS
]
= E(S) +
a
σS
E [S(S − S(S))]
= E(S) +
a
σS
E
[
S2 − SE(S)]
= E(S) +
a
σS
E
[
E(S2)− E(S)E(S)]
= E(S) +
a
σS
σ2S
= E(S) + aσS .
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Applying the plug-in principle and substituting the respective expressions of E[Xih(S)] and
E[Sh(S)] into the general framework presented in Equation 38 we get the allocation principle
we’ve just called Overbeck Type I allocation principle whose form is:
Ki =
K
E(S) + aσS
[
E(Xi) +
a
σS
Cov(Xi, S)
]
. (40)
Overbeck Type II allocation principle is determined by letting h(S) be 11−pI(S > F
−1
S (p)) with
p ∈ (0, 1):
E[Xih(S)] =
1
1− pE[Xi|I(S > F
−1
S (p))]
E[Sh(S)] =
1
1− pE[S|I(S > F
−1
S (p))] = CTEp(S).
Therefore, Ki could be written as:
Ki =
K
CTEp(S)
E[Xi|I(S > F−1S (p))]. (41)
Note this principle is exactly the same one presented in Equation 14 in subsection 5.2
6.2.3 Wang allocation principle
Let us consider h(S) = e
aS
E[eaS ]
with a > 0, we can construct an allocation principle based on Wang
(2007) and give an expression for Ki. In order to achieve our goal the procedure is similar to the
ones used in previous sections.
Once we consider h(S) = e
aS
E[eaS ]
, the expression for E[Xih(S)] is found in the following way:
E[Xih(S)] = E
[
Sh(S) =
eaS
E[eaS ]
]
=
1
E(eaS)
E(Xie
aS)
=
E(Xie
aS)
E(eaS)
.
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Then E[Sh(S)] is:
E[Sh(S)] = E
[
Xih(S) =
eaS
E[eaS ]
]
=
E(SeaS)
E(eaS)
.
Therefore, the allocation of the exogenously given aggregate capital K to n parts K1, . . . ,Kn
corresponding to the different business units can be carried out using:
Ki =
K
E(SeaS)
E(Xie
aS). (42)
6.2.4 Tsanaka allocation principle
If we let
∫ 1
0
eγaS
E(eγaS)
be h(S) with a > 0, then this leads us to the Tsanakas (2009) principle.
Expressions for constructing the Ki are as follow:
E[Xih(S)] = E
[
Xi
∫ 1
0
eγaS
E(eγaS)
dγ
]
,
E[Sh(S)] = E
[
S
∫ 1
0
eγaS
E(eγaS)
]
,
where the Ki to be allocated takes the following form:
Ki =
K
E
[
S
∫ 1
0
eγaS
E(eγaS)
dγ
]E [Xi ∫ 1
0
eγaS
E(eγaS)
dγ
]
. (43)
Letting Ψ be
∫ 1
0
eγaS
E(eγaS)
dγ, then Ki could be rewritten as:
Ki =
K
E(SΨ)
E(XiΨ). (44)
Table 2 summarizes the Aggregate Portfolio Driven Allocations by providing expressions for
Ki.
7 Numerical Examples
Previously we introduced some well-known capital allocation principles, now we give the practical
examples of these approaches and their impact on amounts of allocated capital. For this purpose
we use Public data risk no. 1 and Public data risk no. 2 from Bolancé et al. (2012), these data
consist of 1000 and 400 observed loss amounts for categories 1 and 2, respectively.
Let us consider these data as operative losses in a banking environment. For Public data risk
no. 1 to have some sense in this context we consider it as bank transfer mistakes which means
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Table 2: Aggregate Portfolio Driven Allocations
Reference h(S) Ki
Covariance principle S − E(S) K
V ar[S]
Cov(Xi, S)
Overbeck Type I Overbeck
(2000)
1 + a
S − E(S)
σS
, a ≥ 0 K
E(S) + aσS
[
E(Xi) +
a
σS
Cov(Xi, S)
]
Overbeck Type II Overbeck
(2000)
1
1− p I(S > F
−1
S (p)), p ∈ (0, 1)
K
CTEp(S)
E[Xi|S > F−1S (p)]
Wang (2007) e
aS
E(eaS)
, a > 0
K
E(SeaS)
E(Xie
aS)
Tsanakas (2009)
∫ 1
0
eγaS
E(eγaS)
dγ, a > 0
K
E
[
S
∫ 1
0
eγaS
E(eγaS)
dγ
]E [Xi ∫ 10 eγaSE(eγaS)dγ]
that a bank teller transfers more money than the required to a client’s bank account and Public
data risk no. 2 is to be considered as fraudulent transactions, for instance, a client loses her
credit card and another person uses it, if the bank’s client reports this situation to bank then the
non-authorized use of the credit card will charge some losses to bank.
In this section we quantify individual capital requirements based on risk measures over each
operative losses. Given an exogenous amount of total capital, K calculated as the empirical Value
at Risk at 99% of the aggregate loss (VaR99(S)), the goal is allocating to each loss source an
optimal portion of this capital and comparing three well-known allocation principles: Haircut,
Covariance and Overbeck type II allocation principles, all of them belonging to the proportional
allocations, note that both Covariance and Overbeck type II allocation principles belong to the
Aggregate portfolio allocation principle described in subsection 6.2.
The reason why we decide to use aggregate portfolio allocations is knowing the overall portfolio
performance taking into account the dependence structure, meanwhile, on the other hand, we
choose using Haircut allocation principle in order to make comparisons against a stand-alone risk
measure which does leave out the dependence structure of the risk factors.
Some descriptive insights are provided in Table 3 where one eye-catching fact is the difference
in the number of observations in each vector of losses, Public data risk no. 1 has 1000 observations
and Public data risk no. 2 has 400 which represents a drawback for the configuration of the
allocation principles where all of them implicitly assume identical length for vector of losses,
we overcome this inconvenient by using two different re-sampling techniques: bootstrapping and
an uniformly pairwise random extraction. Another important characteristic of these data is the
strong non-normality suggested by the skewness and the kurtosis coefficients, also this data show
a strong right asymmetry since the mean is larger than the median for both vectors.
The numerical exercises presented below consists of two cases: the first one where the depen-
dence structure is removed by the simulation procedure and in the second one a strong dependence
structure between individual losses is artificially created. The aim of it is checking the perfor-
mance of the allocations principles when two extreme situations might happen.
7.1 Case I: Lack of dependence structure
In this subsection, we assess the performance of allocation principles we are interested in when
losses exhibit a low degree of linear dependence, this means that the correlation coefficient between
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for numerical example data
Public data risk no. 1 Public data risk no. 2
nobs 1000.00 400.00
NAs 0.00 0.00
Minimum 0.00 0.00
Maximum 5122.14 1027.53
1. Quartile 2.24 2.67
3. Quartile 8.46 8.62
Mean 42.06 20.89
Median 3.47 4.29
Sum 42059.41 8357.32
SE Mean 9.23 4.80
Variance 85242.64 9199.45
Stdev 291.96 95.91
Skewness 13.61 9.10
Kurtosis 210.87 89.20
the losses is close enough to zero.
Let X and Y be vectors consisting of 1000 and 400 observations on individual losses, moreover
Public data risk no. 1 is now denoted by X and Public data risk no. 2 is denoted by Y . Recalling
the fact that all the allocation principles presented in this thesis require the vectors to have the
same length, nevertheless X and Y have not that same length, this situation might be the more
common one in practice, to overcome this drawback and compute the allocation principles we
proceed as:9
1. Draw 1000 observations from X and 400 from Y using re-sampling with replacement and
obtain X1 and Y1.
2. Generate x∗1 =
∑1000
i=1 X1,i and y
∗
1 =
∑400
i=1 Y1,i.
3. Repeat steps 1) and 2) 10000 times to obtain two vectors of equal lengths: X∗ and Y ∗ with
X∗ = {x∗i }10000i=1 and Y ∗ = {y∗i }10000i=1 .
Once we have X∗ and Y ∗ having the same length we can now compute the allocations based
on the principles previously discussed.
Summarizing we generate for both vectors of losses 10000 replications of size 1000 and 400 for
Public data risk no. 1 and for Public data risk no. 2, respectively in order to obtain two vectors
of length 10000 over which we can apply the allocation principle we are interested in. In the i−th
iteration we sum up all the re-sampled points to get the i − th element of each vector and we
repeat this procedure 10000 times as i moves from 1 to 10000. This way the non-identical length
problem of the vectors is overcome. Now we have to allocate a total amount of exogenous capital
9See the implementation of this procedure using R code in the appendix section.
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Table 4: Case I. Capital allocation based on different principles
HAP CAP Overbeck II
X∗ (dat1.boot) 62953.00 72497.53 66070.96
Y ∗ (dat2.boot) 12620.96 3076.43 9503.00
Total 75573.96 75573.96 75573.96
which we estimate using an empirical VaR99(S), this means, the aggregate capital is chosen to
be the empirical Value at Risk of the aggregate loss. Note that we now have two risk sources and
10 000 observations associated to each risk source.
An aggregate capital amount of 50 416.7310 monetary units would be enough for facing the
total loss for this particular sample comprised by X and Y (Public data risk no. 1 and Public
data risk no. 2, respectively). Nevertheless, in order to guarantee a coverage even when large
deviations might occur we use the empirical VaR99(S) = 75 573.96 that ensures 99% coverage of
potential losses and this is why we set the exogenous capital to be this value. Aggregate capital
to be allocated is 75 573.96 monetary units.
Table 4 shows the allocated capital to each vector of losses based on different capital allocation
principles, these results show the amount of capital to be set aside for each risk source. Note
that Haircut allocation principle (HAP) boils down to a simple proportion when there is not any
dependence structure (in a linear sense) between the losses, this happens when the correlation
coefficient between X∗ and Y ∗ is close to zero and in this particular case such correlation is
≈ 0.00014, therefore results obtained from HAP will be identical to those obtained using:
Ki =
K∑n
i=1Xi
Xi, (45)
recalling the fact that
∑n
i=1Xi = S, this “simple proportional” allocation principle (SPA) reduces
to (K/S)Xi. When K = 1 and multiplying the result by 100 gives us the percentage of Xi as a
portion of the aggregate loss S as it is shown in Table 5.
According to Table 3 the losses seem to be non-normal, therefore both Haircut and Overbeck
type II allocations are computed using the normal and the t-student distribution, for the t-student
we used several degrees of freedom and results do not differ from those ones reported when using
a normal distribution, so in Table 4 only normal results are reported.
For we to assess how well the allocations fit, we now calculate the proportions of capital to
be set aside instead of the amount of capital, we reach this goal by choosing K = 1 and the new
results are reported in Table 5.
As it was expected, the Haircut allocation principle is a good choice since it does not take into
account the dependence structure and since the correlation between X∗ and Y ∗ is almost zero the
best choice for this case is using Equation 45 as the allocation principle, because its results are the
a good enough approximation for HAP and its calculation is enormously simplified, furthermore
it does not rely on any distributional assumption. Table 5 shows how the approximation to HAP
using Equation 45 performs compared to HAP results.
10This aggregate capital comes from summing 42059.41 and 8357.32, see row labelled Sum in Table 3
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Table 5: Case I. Proportions of capital allocation based on different principles
SPA HAP CAP Overbeck II
dat1.boot 0.8344 0.833 0.9593 0.8743
dat2.boot 0.1656 0.167 0.0407 0.1257
In Table 5 there is an additional column: SPA which is the approximation to the HAP when
correlation tends to zero, we present this information in order to compare the proportions based
on each principle. We can see that HAP is identical to SPA, nevertheless the Covariance allocation
principle overestimates the contribution of the first vector and underestimates the second one in
a stronger way than Overbeck II does. In a rough sense we can see that in absence of correlation
between losses, the estimates of the Covariance allocation principle are more biased than those
of Overbeck II.
Clearly in this part of the exercise we conclude that Covariance allocation principle performs
the worst compared to the other two principles.
In the next section we introduce a strong dependence structure in order to assess the perfor-
mance of the allocations which account for correlation among losses.
7.2 Case II: Strong dependence structure
This section can be seen as the counterpart of the previous one as now we go to the other extreme
case where a strong dependence framework is involved.
In order to create two vectors of losses strongly correlated we base the sampling scheme on
quantiles-based extractions, this means for each probability pi with i = 1, . . . , 10000, which is
common for both vectors X and Y , recall that X is the label for Public data risk no. 1 and Y is
the label for Public data risk no. 2, we take the value located at quantile given by F−1X (pi) and
F−1Y (pi), each pi was randomly drawn from a U(0, 1), to make this point clear, we go through the
following steps:11
1. Draw randomly 10000 values from a U(0, 1) for probabilities such that p1 is one realization
of U(0, 1), p2 is another, and so on until p10000.
2. Generate W and Z such that both are vectors of dimension 10000× 1 holding F−1X (pi) and
F−1Y (pi).
3. Constructing W and Z this way guarantees that when we have a small value for W we also
have a small value for Z and when we have a large for one W we also have a large one for
Z. We store W and Z into a matrix M of dimension 10000× 2 so that W and Z are now
matched (pairwise).
4. Resample row-wise with replacement from M and draw 10000 pairs of observations, sum
them colwise and get m1 which is a 1 × 2 vector, repeat this step 10000 times in order to
get mi with i = 1, . . . , 10000.
11See the implementation of this procedure using R code in the appendix section.
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5. The data set we are going to work with is the matrix M∗ consisting of the colwise concate-
nation of mi with i = 1, . . . , 10000. M∗ should look like:
M∗ =
 m1,1 m1,2... ...
m10000,1 m10000,2

6. We call the first column of M∗ as X ′ and the second one is called Y ′ where X ′ is the
resampled observations of the transfer mistakes (Public data risk no. 1 ) and Y ′ is the
resampled associated to the fraudulent transactions (Public data risk no. 2 ). Here the
apostrophe does not mean transpose, it is just a way to nameX and Y in order to distinguish
them from the originals X and Y .
Given that we suffer from different lengths for vectors of losses, we base this part of the
exercise on a resampling technique using a uniform distribution as described above, this consists
of generating 10000 random numbers from a uniform distribution, U(0, 1), then we use this
numbers to extract the empirical quantiles from each vectors, this way we obtain two vector of
length 10000 with a strong dependence structure since each time we draw a “small” value from
the first vector we also get a “small” value from the second one, the same happens with “big”
values, this is because we are using the 10000 uniform number as index for the inverse distribution
function to retrieve those numbers.
The correlation coefficient enrolled in this case is ≈ 0.8875, this is the correlation between X ′
and Y ′, which is the “strong” dependence structure giving name to this section.
Following the same idea from the previous section, we consider the total capital to be allocated
as exogenously determined and taken as given, so we consider this capital to be the empirical
Value at Risk at 99% which is 628 724.6 monetary units.
Table 6: Case II. Capital allocation based on different principles
HAP CAP Overbeck II
X ′ 412897.2 464021.7 414842.6
Y ′ 215827.3 164702.9 213882.0
Total 628724.6 628724.6 628724.6
Table 6 presents the total capital and the amounts to be allocated to each business units.
Note that the first business unit, called X ′ is again the riskiest one, so more capital is allocated
to it. One important point, when linear dependence between these two business unit becomes
higher, is that all allocation principles are very close to each other, we were aware of this fact
for both CAP and Overbeck II since they takes into account the dependence structure. Looking
at the Haircut allocation principle (HAP) we can see that when correlation between losses is
close to one then its results quietly differ from those obtained with Equation 45, it is clearly seen
since now risks are dependent each other and this is the key reason why allocations based on
(the approximation to HAP) surely leads us to misleading allocations. Note that approximation
provided by Equation 45, when correlation is high, becomes biased.
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Table 7: Case II. Proportions of capital allocation based on different principles
SPA HAP CAP OverbeckII
X ′ 0.6503 0.6567 0.7380 0.6598
Y ′ 0.3497 0.3433 0.2620 0.3402
In terms of proportions, Table 7 gives a picture of how the principles distribute the total
capital between the business units. The first column represents the results using Equation 45,
this would be the allocation if correlation between risk sources were zero, in this case the optimal
distribution of the total capital should be 65.03% allocated to the first business line (bank transfer
mistakes) and 34.97% to the loss caused by fraudulent transactions. Since correlation between
risk sources is 0.8910, then allocation based on Equation 45 is biased, so principles that includes
the linear dependence in its calculations are needed.
In spite of the fact that HAP is based on the idea of measuring stand-alone losses using a
VaR (normal VaR in this case) it performs well enough even if the correlation is high, but one
has to have in mind that VaR is not a coherent risk measure so in this case it is better off using
a coherent risk measure for capital allocation, from this point we can choose either Covariance
allocation principle or Overbeck type II allocation principle, but in practice HAP and CAP results
are not so different.
We perform a set of simulations in order to find evidence of differences among these three
allocation principles when varying the correlations and running thousands of random drawings.
8 A simulation study: Assessing the correlation effect
This section is intended to examine how sensible the allocation principles under study are when
changing the linear dependence between the losses. The aim of this section is to answer, through
a simulation study, the following question: How much does the allocated capital based on each
principle differ when changing the correlation between the losses? In order to answer this question
we consider two cases which are explained below.
The simulation study consists of drawing 100 random number from a multivariate normal
distribution for two business lines with vector of means µ and covariance matrix Σ for different
correlation coefficients: 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 and 1, where we can see the
linear relationship goes from non-relationship at all until a perfect correlation. We apply the
three capital allocation principles to these losses, and we repeat this step 1000 times, then we
report the mean value of the allocations over theses 1000 results.
8.1 Case I: Risk sources with same mean and variance
In this case we consider both business lines are equally risky (in terms of variances) and also they
have the same mean:12
12Note that these means correspond to the mean of Public data risk no. 1 presented in Table 3
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µ =
(
42.05941
42.05941
)
,
and the variance-covariance matrix takes the form:13
Σ =
(
94442.09 σ1,2
σ2,1 94442.09
)
,
where σ1,2 = σ2,1 and it is such that we can obtain the following correlation coefficients:
ρ = 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 and 1.
Within this case we have two business lines with equal variances and equal means, the only
difference in each replication of the simulation is the covariance (correlation) so that we can
disentangle the “correlation effect” for each allocation based on the different principles which are
the target of this study.
The reason why we set both, the means and the variances to be the same for both business
lines, is that we expect the allocated capital to be one half in expected value for each vector,
so this is a rough method to look into the robustness of each allocation principle when only the
correlation is allowed to change.
Table 8: Simulation results Case I.
Business / correlation 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Line1 (Haircut) 0.4982 0.4999 0.5009 0.5003 0.5006 0.5003 0.5009 0.501 0.5007 0.5 0.5
Line2 (Haircut) 0.5018 0.5001 0.4991 0.4997 0.4994 0.4997 0.4991 0.499 0.4993 0.5 0.5
Line1 (Covariance) 0.4975 0.5007 0.5015 0.5007 0.5007 0.5004 0.5009 0.5011 0.5007 0.4996 0.5
Line2 (Covariance) 0.5025 0.4993 0.4985 0.4993 0.4993 0.4996 0.4991 0.4989 0.4993 0.5004 0.5
Line1 (Overbeck II) 0.5025 0.4997 0.5064 0.4991 0.5013 0.4987 0.5008 0.5005 0.5005 0.5003 0.5
Line2 (Overbeck II) 0.4975 0.5003 0.4936 0.5009 0.4987 0.5013 0.4992 0.4995 0.4995 0.4997 0.5
From Table 8 the main conclusion is that the linear relationship between the losses does not
play any important role for the allocation principles to be good enough and whose results are
almost identical, this is true (based on the simulation study) if and only if the vector of losses
are characterized by the same mean and variance. This result leads us to think that there is not
reason to choose one or other principle, under these circumstances (identical mean and variance)
any principle gives almost the same answer.
8.2 Case II: Risk sources with same mean but different variances
The second case under study in the simulation is keeping the means equal for both business lines
and allowing different variances for them, and again we study the effect of correlations on the
estimation of the allocated capital using the three principles which are the scope of this thesis.
The vector of means is the same as that used in the previous section and the covariance matrix
now is:
13Note that these variances correpond to the mean of Public data risk no. 2 presented in Table 3
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Σ =
(
85242.64 σ1,2
σ2,1 94442.09
)
,
here σ1,2 = σ2,1 and it is chosen such that we can obtain the following correlation coefficients:
ρ = 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 and 1. Note that these variances are the sample vari-
ances of the Public data risk 1 and 2, respectively.
Table 9: Simulation results Case II.
Business / correlation 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Line1 (Haircut) 0.721 0.7222 0.7215 0.7223 0.7228 0.7232 0.7229 0.7227 0.7231 0.7235 0.723
Line2 (Haircut) 0.279 0.2778 0.2785 0.2777 0.2772 0.2768 0.2771 0.2773 0.2769 0.2765 0.277
Line1 (Covariance) 0.9022 0.8796 0.859 0.8414 0.825 0.8105 0.7965 0.7838 0.7727 0.7628 0.7527
Line2 (Covariance) 0.0978 0.1204 0.141 0.1586 0.175 0.1895 0.2035 0.2162 0.2273 0.2372 0.2473
Line1 (Overbeck II) 0.8545 0.834 0.8187 0.801 0.7916 0.7792 0.7666 0.7558 0.7438 0.7373 0.7284
Line2 (Overbeck II) 0.1455 0.166 0.1813 0.199 0.2084 0.2208 0.2334 0.2442 0.2562 0.2627 0.2716
Some interesting pointers from this simulation are highlighted below:
• One interesting result stems1 from Table 9 is the allocation suggested by the Covariance
principle when the correlation is zero, in general, when the variances are different keeping
the means equal for both business lines, reduces to V ar(Xi)∑n
i=1 V ar(Xi)
, i = 1, . . . , n. When
correlation is different from zero the Covariance principle incorporates this information for
the allocation estimates.
• The Haircut allocation principle is not affected by the linear dependence of the losses, this
is because it is based on the Value at Risk and this is well-known as “stand-alone risk
measure” see subsection 5.1.
• The larger the correlation the closer is the Overbeck type II allocation estimates to the
Haircut allocation estimates.
• The larger the correlation the closer is the Covariance allocation estimates to the Haircut
allocation estimates, but Overbeck type II converges faster than the Covariance allocation
principle to the Haircut allocations.
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9 Conclusions and Future Research
In this study we present the allocation problem and based on Dhaene et al. (2012) we provide
explicit formulation for Ki when using different specifications for business unit driven principles
as well as aggregate portfolio driven allocations.
The numerical exercise carried out shows that the configuration of the allocations depends
on the degree of linear dependence, this result motivates a simulation study to investigate the
“correlation effect”. We find that if losses have same mean and variance, then correlation plays
no important role on the allocations. On the other hand, non-identical variance gives rise to the
correlation effect.
Changes in the correlation structure of the losses are important when losses have different
second-moment, the more correlated the losses are, the bigger the amount of money required for
facing risk.
Haircut allocation principle, even being a principle based on a non-coherent risk measure,
experiences a good performance and it is less affected by the “correlation effect” (changes in the
correlations). Haircut allocations are very similar to those suggested by Overbeck type II principle
when correlation is high, this confirms the good performance of Haircut allocation principle.
This thesis is companied by an R package named OCA to allow other researchers to repro-
duce the results presented here and widespread the use of different allocation principle under R
programming language. The package has been entirely developed by the author.
OCA package computes optimal capital allocation based on some standard principles such as
Haircut, Overbeck type II and the Covariance Allocation Principle. Also it provides some short-
cuts for obtaining the Value at Risk and the Expectation Shortfall, using both the normal and
the t-student distribution.
As future research we propose to expand the package functionality by adding some other
allocation principles discussed in this work. Once OCA is completed we can enrich both the
numerical example and the simulation study.
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10 Appendix
10.1 R codes for estimations of the numerical examples: Case I and Case II
# Installing and loading OCA package
# install.packages("OCA_0.1.tar.gz", repos = NULL, type = "source")
library(OCA)
# Loading the datasets
data(dat1)
data(dat2)
#------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Descriptive Statistics
library("fBasics")
#library("Hmisc")
Descript <- cbind( basicStats(dat1), basicStats(dat2))
colnames(Descript) <- c("X", "Y")
#latex(round(Descript, 2), file="")
#------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Numerical example: Case I.
#------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Overcoming the non-equal length of vectors
set.seed(1)
Replications <- 10000
dat1.boot <- colSums(replicate(Replications, sample(dat1[,1], nrow(dat1), replace=TRUE)))
dat2.boot <- colSums(replicate(Replications, sample(dat2[,1], nrow(dat2), replace=TRUE)))
# Both sampled vectors now have the same length
length(dat1.boot)
length(dat2.boot)
# Building the Loss matrix
Lboot <- cbind(dat1.boot, dat2.boot)
cor(Lboot)
# Building S_i
S_i <- rowSums(Lboot)
# Setting the aggregate capital K so be the 99\% empirical VaR
K <- quantile(S_i, probs = 0.99) # alternative: sort(S_i)[length(S_i)*.99]
## -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Getting K_i based on different capital allocation principles:
# Haircut Allocation Principle
H <- hap(Loss=Lboot, Capital=K)
Hprop <- hap(Loss=Lboot, Capital=1)
#---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Covariance Allocation Principle
C <- cap(Loss=Lboot, Capital=K)
Cprop <- cap(Loss=Lboot, Capital=1)
#---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Overbeck type II Allocation Principle
Cte <- Overbeck2(Loss=Lboot, Capital=K)
Cteprop <- Overbeck2(Loss=Lboot, Capital=1)
#---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Comparing all results
Allboot <- data.frame( H, C, Cte)
colnames(Allboot) <- c( "HAP", "CAP", "Overbeck_II")
Allboot <- rbind(Allboot, Total=colSums(Allboot))
Allboot
#latex(round(Allboot, 2), file="")
Allprop <- data.frame(colSums(Lboot)/sum(Lboot), Hprop, Cprop, Cteprop)
colnames(Allprop) <- c("SPA", "HAP", "CAP", "CTEAP")
Allprop
#latex(round(Allprop, 4), file="")
#------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Numerical example: Case II.
#------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Overcoming the non-equal length of vectors
set.seed(1)
unif <- runif(10000)
dat1.unif <- quantile(dat1[,1], unif)
dat2.unif <- quantile(dat2[,1], unif)
Lunif <- cbind(dat1.unif , dat2.unif)
# Creating a boot sampling
set.seed(1)
Lunif.boot <- t(replicate(Replications,
colSums(Lunif[sample(1:Replications,
Replications, TRUE), ])))
# Verifying the correlation
cor(Lunif.boot)
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# Building S_i
S_iunif <- rowSums(Lunif.boot)
# Setting the aggregate capital K so be the 99\% empirical VaR
K <- quantile(S_iunif, probs = 0.99)
## -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Getting K_i based on different capital allocation principles:
# Haircut Allocation Principle
H <- hap(Loss=Lunif, Capital=K)
Hprop <- hap(Loss=Lunif, Capital=1)
#---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Covariance Allocation Principle
C <- cap(Loss=Lunif, Capital=K)
Cprop <- cap(Loss=Lunif, Capital=1)
#---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Overbeck type II Allocation Principle
Cte <- Overbeck2(Loss=Lunif, Capital=K)
Cteprop <- Overbeck2(Loss=Lunif, Capital=1)
#---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Comparing all results
AlLunif <- data.frame( H, C, Cte)
colnames(AlLunif) <- c("HAP", "CAP", "CTEAP")
AlLunif
Allprop <- data.frame(colSums(Lunif)/sum(Lunif), Hprop, Cprop, Cteprop)
colnames(Allprop) <- c("SPA", "HAP", "CAP", "CTEAP")
Allprop
10.2 R codes for the simulation study: Case I and Case II
#------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# A simulation study
#------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# "getCov" takes a vector of correltion as argument and two variances to return
# a covariance matrix for each rho and var1 and var1, it solves this equation
# cov=rho*sqrt(var1, var2)
getCov <- function(rho, var1, var2){
rho <- rho
prodsigmas <- sqrt(var1) * sqrt(var2)
Cov <- rho * prodsigmas
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Sigmas <- lapply(1:length(Cov), function(x,i) {
matrix(c(var1, x[i], x[i], var2), ncol=2)
}, x=Cov)
return(Sigmas)
}
library(MASS) # to use "mvrnorm" function
#------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# CASE I
#------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Setting initial parameters
mu1 <- rep(mean(dat1[,1]), 2)
variance1 <- var(dat1[,1]) + var(dat2[,1])
sigmas <- getCov(rho=seq(0,1,.1), var1=variance1, var2=variance1)
N <- 1000 # Number of simulations to run used in "replicate" funcion
n <- 100 # sample size to be passed to "mvrnorm" function
DimNames <- list(c("Line 1", "Line 2"), paste(seq(0,1,.1)))
# HAP
set.seed(1)
case1.sim.hap <- replicate(N, sapply(lapply(sigmas, mvrnorm, n=n, mu=mu1),
hap, Capital=1))
case1.hap <- apply(case1.sim.hap, c(1,2), mean)
dimnames(case1.hap) <- DimNames
round(case1.hap, 4)
# CAP
set.seed(1)
case1.sim.cap <- replicate(N, sapply(lapply(sigmas, mvrnorm, n=n, mu=mu1),
cap, Capital=1))
case1.cap <- apply(case1.sim.cap, c(1,2), mean)
dimnames(case1.cap) <- DimNames
round(case1.cap, 4)
# Overheck II
set.seed(1)
case1.sim.Overbeck2 <- replicate(N, sapply(lapply(sigmas, mvrnorm, n=n, mu=mu1),
Overbeck2, Capital=1))
case1.Overbeck2 <- apply(case1.sim.Overbeck2, c(1,2), mean, na.rm=TRUE)
dimnames(case1.Overbeck2) <- DimNames
round(case1.Overbeck2, 4)
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#------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# CASE II
#------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Setting initial parameters
mu2 <- rep(mean(dat1[,1]), 2)
sigmas2 <- getCov(rho=seq(0,1,.1), var1=var(dat1[,1]), var2=var(dat2[,1]))
# HAP
set.seed(1)
case2.sim.hap <- replicate(N, sapply(lapply(sigmas2, mvrnorm, n=n, mu=mu2),
hap, Capital=1))
case2.hap <- apply(case2.sim.hap, c(1,2), mean)
dimnames(case2.hap) <- DimNames
round(case2.hap, 4)
# CAP
set.seed(1)
case2.sim.cap <- replicate(N, sapply(lapply(sigmas2, mvrnorm, n=n, mu=mu2),
cap, Capital=1))
case2.cap <- apply(case2.sim.cap, c(1,2), mean)
dimnames(case2.cap) <- DimNames
round(case2.cap, 4)
# Overheck II
set.seed(1)
case2.sim.Overbeck2 <- replicate(N, sapply(lapply(sigmas2, mvrnorm, n=n, mu=mu2),
Overbeck2, Capital=1))
case2.Overbeck2 <- apply(case2.sim.Overbeck2, c(1,2), mean, na.rm=TRUE)
dimnames(case2.Overbeck2) <- DimNames
round(case2.Overbeck2, 4)
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10.3 OCA package manual
Package ‘OCA’
OCA stands for Optimal Capital Allocations
Description:
OCA computes optimal capital allocation based on some standard principles such as Haircut,
Overbeck type II and the Covariance Allocation Principle. It also provides some shortcuts for
obtaining the Value at Risk and the Expectation Shortfall, under both normality and student t
distributional assumptions for the vector of losses.
Details:
Package: OCA
Type: Package
Version: 0.1
Date: 2013-04-14
License: LGPL (>= 2)
Author:
Jilber Urbina
Maintainer:
Jilber Urbina <jilberurbina@gmail.com>
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Type Package
Title Optimal Capital Allocations
Version 0.1
Date 2013-04-14
Author Jilber Urbina
Maintainer Jilber Urbina <jilberurbina@gmail.com>
Description Computes optimal capital allocations based on different risk measures
License GPL2.0
Encoding latin1
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2 cap
OCA-package Optimal Capital Allocation Principles
Description
OCA computes optimal capital allocation based on some standard principles such as Haircut, Over-
beck type II and the Covariance Allocation Principle. Also it provides some shortcuts for obtaining
the Value at Risk and the Expectation Shortfall, using both the normal and the t-student distribution.
Details
Package: OCA
Type: Package
Version: 0.1
Date: 2013-04-14
License: LGPL (>= 2)
Author(s)
Jilber Urbina
Maintainer: Jilber Urbina <jilberurbina@gmail.com>
References
Bolance, C., Guillen, M., Gustafsson, J. and Nielsen, J.P. (2012) Quantitative Operational Risk
Models, Chapman & Hall/CRC.
Dhaene J., Tsanakas A., Valdez E. and Vanduffel S. (2011). Optimal Capital Allocation Principles.
The Journal of Risk and Insurance. Vol. 79, No. 1, 1-28.
McNeil, A. J.; Frey, R. & Embrechts, P. Quantitative risk management: concepts, techniques and
tools. Princeton University Press, 2005
Urbina, J. Quantifying Optimal Capital Allocation Principles based on Risk Measures. Universitat
Politecnica de Catalunya. 2013.
cap Covariance Allocation Principle
Description
This function implements the covariance allocation principle for optimal capital allocation.
cap 3
Usage
cap(Loss, Capital)
Arguments
Loss A matrix containing the individual losses in each column
Capital A scalar representing the capital to be allocated to each loss.
Details
The Covariance Allocation Principle correspond to the following expression:
Ki =
K
V ar[S]
Cov(Xi, S), i = 1, . . . , n,
where Ki is the capital to be allocated to the ith loss, K is the total capital to be allocated, Xi is the
individual unit loss and S is the total (aggretate) loss, this comes from
∑
iXi. Cov(Xi, S) is the
covariance between the individual loss Xi and the aggregate loss S; and V ar(S) is the variance of
the aggregate loss.
Value
A n× 1 matrix containing each asset and the corresponding capital allocation. If Capital=1, then
the returned value will be the proportions of capital required by each loss to be faced.
Author(s)
Jilber Urbina
References
Dhaene J., Tsanakas A., Valdez E. and Vanduffel S. (2011). Optimal Capital Allocation Principles.
The Journal of Risk and Insurance. Vol. 00, No. 0, 1-28.
See Also
Overbeck2, hap
Examples
data(dat1, dat2)
Loss <- cbind(Loss1=dat1[1:400, ], Loss2=unname(dat2))
# Proportions of capital to be allocated to each bussines unit
cap(Loss, Capital=1)
# Capital allocation,
# capital is determined as the empirical VaR of the losses at 99%
K <- quantile(rowSums(Loss), probs = 0.99)
cap(Loss, Capital=K)
4 dat2
dat1 Public data risk no. 1
Description
Dataset named Public data risk no. 1 consisting in 1000 of simulated data.
Usage
data(dat1)
Format
A data frame with 1000 observations on the following variable.
y a numeric vector
References
Bolance, C.; Guillen, M.; Gustafsson, J. & Nielsen, J. P. Quantitative Operational Risk Models
Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2012
Examples
data(dat1)
dat2 Public data risk no. 2
Description
Dataset named Public data risk no. 1 consisting in 400 of simulated data.
Usage
data(dat2)
Format
A data frame with 400 observations on the following variable.
y a numeric vector
References
Bolance, C.; Guillen, M.; Gustafsson, J. & Nielsen, J. P. Quantitative Operational Risk Models
Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2012
ES 5
Examples
data(dat2)
ES Expected Shortfall
Description
Computes the Expected Shortfall of a given amount of loss.
Usage
ES(Loss, varcov, alpha = 0.95, weights = NULL,
model = c("normal", "t-student", "both"),
df = NULL)
Arguments
Loss Either a single-numeric value or a vector representing the mean loss(es) to which
the ES is to be calculated.
varcov If Loss is a single-numeric value, then varcov must be a scalar denoting the
variance of the loss, otherwise, if Loss is a vector of N elements, then varcov
must be a variance-covariance matrix of dimension N ×N .
alpha A numeric value (either a single one or a vector) consisting of the significance
level at which ES has to be computed, it can either be a single numeric value or
a vector of numeric values.
weights A vector of weights of size N for computing both the mean and the variance
of the vector of Losses, it is applicable only when Loss is a vector. When
weights=NULL mean and variaces used to compute ES are the original values
supplied to Losses and varcov.
model A character string indicating which distribution is to be used for computing
the ES, the default value is the normal distribution, the other alternative is t-
student distribution with υ degrees of freedom. When model=’both’ ’normal’
as well as ’t-student’ are used when computing the ES, see examples.
df An integer indicating the degrees of freedom for the t-student distribution when
setting model=’t-student’ and model=’both’. df must be greater than 2.
Details
ES computes the Expected Shortfall (ES) of a certaing amount of loss based upon the following
general formulation:
ESα =
1
(1− α)
∫ 1
α
V aRu(X)du = E[X|X > F−1X (α)].
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where α is the significance level, V aRu(X) is the Value-at-Risk of X.
ES for the normal case is based on the following expression:
ESα = µ+ σ
φ(Φ−1(α))
1− α
Meanwhile, ES for the t-student distribution takes comes from:
ESα(X˜) =
gυ(t
−1
υ (α))
1− α
(
υ + (t−1υ (α))
2
υ − 1
)
Value
A data.frame containing the ES for each significance level specified.
Author(s)
Jilber Urbina
References
Dhaene J., Tsanakas A., Valdez E. and Vanduffel S. (2011). Optimal Capital Allocation Principles.
The Journal of Risk and Insurance. Vol. 79, No. 1, 1-28.
McNeil, A. J.; Frey, R. & Embrechts, P. Quantitative risk management: concepts, techniques and
tools. Princeton University Press, 2005
See Also
VaR, Risk
Examples
# Exercise 2.21, page 46 in McNeil et al (2005)
alpha <- c(.90, .95, .975, .99, .995)
(ES(Loss=1, varcov=(0.2/sqrt(250))^2, alpha=alpha, model=’normal’)-1)*10000
(ES(Loss=1, varcov=(0.2/sqrt(250))^2, alpha=alpha, model=’t-student’, df=4)-1)*10000
# Both type of models at once.
(ES(Loss=1, varcov=(0.2/sqrt(250))^2, alpha=alpha, model=’both’, df=4)-1)*10000
# A vector of losses
L <- c(10,40) # a vector of two (mean) losses
varcov <- matrix(c(100,150,150,900), 2) # covariance matrix
w <- c(0.5, 0.5) # a vector weights
ES(Loss=L, varcov=varcov, weights=w, alpha=0.95)
hap 7
hap Haircut Allocation Principle
Description
Capital allocation based on the Haircut Allocation Principle.
Usage
hap(Loss, Capital, alpha = 0.95,
model = "normal", df = NULL)
Arguments
Loss Either a scalar or a vector of size N containing the mean losses.
Capital A scalar representing the capital to be allocated to each loss.
alpha A numeric value (either a single one or a vector) consisting of the significance
level at which ES has to be computed, it can either be a single numeric value or
a vector of numeric values.
model A character string indicating which distribution is to be used for computing the
VaR underlying the Haircut Allocation Principle (HAP), the default value is
the normal distribution, the other alternative is t-student distribution with υ
degrees of freedom. When model=’both’ ’normal’ as well as ’t-student’
are used when computing the HAP, see examples.
df An integer indicating the degrees of freedom for the t-student distribution when
setting model=’t-student’ and model=’both’. df must be greater than 2.
Details
This function computes the capital allocation based on the so-called Haircut Allocation Principle
whose expression is as follows:
Ki =
K∑n
j=1 F
−1
Xj
(p)
F−1Xi (p)
For i = 1, . . . , n, where Ki represents the optimal capital to be allocated to each individual loss for
the i-th business unit, K is the total capital to be allocated, F−1Xi (p) is the quantile function (VaR)
for the i-th loss.
Value
A real-valued n× 1 matrix containing the optimal capital allocation, if Capital is set to 1, then the
returned matrix will consist of the proportions of capital each individual loss needs to be optimally
faced.
8 Overbeck2
Author(s)
Jilber Urbina
References
Dhaene J., Tsanakas A., Valdez E. and Vanduffel S. (2011). Optimal Capital Allocation Principles.
The Journal of Risk and Insurance. Vol. 79, No. 1, 1-28.
McNeil, A. J.; Frey, R. & Embrechts, P. Quantitative risk management: concepts, techniques and
tools. Princeton University Press, 2005
See Also
Overbeck2, cap
Examples
data(dat1, dat2)
Loss <- cbind(Loss1=dat1[1:400, ], Loss2=unname(dat2))
# Proportions of capital to be allocated to each bussines unit
hap(Loss, Capital=1)
# Capital allocation,
# capital is determined as the empirical VaR of the losses at 99%
K <- quantile(rowSums(Loss), probs = 0.99)
hap(Loss, Capital=K)
Overbeck2 Overbeck type II Allocation Principle
Description
This function implements the Overbeck type II allocation principle for optimal capital allocation.
Usage
Overbeck2(Loss, Capital, alpha = 0.95,
model = c("normal", "t-student", "both"), df = NULL)
Arguments
Loss Either a scalar or a vector of size N containing the mean losses.
Capital A scalar representing the capital to be allocated to each loss.
alpha A numeric value (either a single one or a vector) consisting of the significance
level at which the allocation has to be computed, it can either be a single numeric
value or a vector of numeric values.
Overbeck2 9
model A character string indicating which distribution is to be used for computing the
VaR underlying the Overbeck type II principle, the default value is the normal
distribution, the other alternative is t-student distribution with υ degrees of
freedom. When model=’both’ ’normal’ as well as ’t-student’ are used
when computing the allocations, see examples.
df An integer indicating the degrees of freedom for the t-student distribution when
setting model=’t-student’ and model=’both’. df must be greater than 2.
Details
Overbeck2 computes the capital allocation based on the following formulation:
Ki =
K
CTEp[S]
E
[
Xi|S > F−1XS (p)
]
, i = 1, . . . , n.
Where K is the aggregate capital to be allocated, CTEp[S] is the Conditional Tail Expectation of
the aggregate loss at level p, Xi is the individual loss, S is the aggregate loss and F−1X (p) is the
quantile function of X at level p
Value
A real-valued n× 1 matrix containing the optimal capital allocation, if Capital is set to 1, then the
returned matrix will consist of the proportions of capital each individual loss needs to be optimally
faced.
Author(s)
Jilber Urbina
References
Dhaene J., Tsanakas A., Valdez E. and Vanduffel S. (2011). Optimal Capital Allocation Principles.
The Journal of Risk and Insurance. Vol. 79, No. 1, 1-28.
See Also
hap, cap
Examples
data(dat1, dat2)
Loss <- cbind(Loss1=dat1[1:400, ], Loss2=unname(dat2))
# Proportions of capital to be allocated to each bussines unit
Overbeck2(Loss, Capital=1)
# Capital allocation,
# capital is determined as the empirical VaR of the losses at 99%
K <- quantile(rowSums(Loss), probs = 0.99)
Overbeck2(Loss, Capital=K)
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Risk Risk measures suchs as Value at Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall
(ES) with normal and t-student distributions.
Description
Standard risk measures such VaR and ES are provided by Risk. Both VaR and ES can be computed
using either the normal or t-student distribution.
Usage
Risk(Loss, varcov, alpha = 0.95,
measure = c("VaR", "ES", "both"),
weights = NULL,
model = c("normal", "t-student", "both"),
df = NULL)
Arguments
Loss It could be either a scalar or a $m x 1$ matrix containing the mean losses.
varcov A scalar corresponding to the variance of the loss, if Loss is a $m x 1$ matrix,
then varcov must be a $m x m$ matrix containing the variances and covariances
of the losses.
alpha The confidence level at which either the VaR or the ES will be computed, by
default alpha is set to 0.95.
measure An optional character string giving a measure for computing the risk. "VaR"
stands for Value at Risk, "ES" stands for Expected Shortfall, and if both is cho-
sen, then the function returns both the VaR and the ES as a result. By default
measure is set to be "VaR".
weights A vector cointaining the weights. It is only needed if Loss is a matrix, if it is not
then weights is set to 1.
model A character string indicating which probability model has to be used for com-
puting the risk measures, it could only be a normal distribution or a t-student
distribution with $v$ degrees of freedom. The normal distibution is the default
model for this funcion. model also allows the user to set ’both’ if she wishes
both normal and t-student VaR or ES depending on what she choses in measure.
See example below.
df An integer (df>2) denoting the degrees of freedom, only required if model=’t-
student’. Otherwise it has to be NULL.
Value
A data.frame containing each risk measure at its corresponding confidence level.
VaR 11
Author(s)
Jilber Urbina.
References
McNeal A., Frey R. and Embrechts P (2005). Quantitative Risk Management: Concepts, Tech-
niques and Tools. Princeton Series of Finance. ISBN 0-691-12255-5
See Also
VaR
Examples
# Reproducing Table 2.1 in page 47 of
# McNeal A., Frey R. and Embrechts P (2005).
alpha <- c(.90, .95, .975, .99, .995)
(Risk(Loss=1, varcov=(0.2/sqrt(250))^2, alpha=alpha,
measure=’both’, model=’both’, df=4)-1)*10000
# only VaR results
(Risk(Loss=1, varcov=(0.2/sqrt(250))^2, alpha=alpha,
measure=’VaR’, model=’both’, df=4)-1)*10000
# only normal VaR results
(Risk(Loss=1, varcov=(0.2/sqrt(250))^2, alpha=alpha)-1)*10000
# only SE based on a 4 degrees t-student.
(Risk(Loss=1, varcov=(0.2/sqrt(250))^2, alpha=alpha,
measure=’ES’, model=’t-student’, df=4)-1)*10000
VaR Value at Risk
Description
Computes Value at Risk based on both normal and t-student distribution.
Usage
VaR(Loss, varcov, alpha = 0.95, weights = NULL,
model = c("normal", "t-student", "both"),
df = NULL)
12 VaR
Arguments
Loss It could be either a scalar or a $m x 1$ matrix containing the mean losses.
varcov A scalar corresponding to the variance of the loss, if Loss is a $m x1$ matrix,
then varcov must be a $m xm$ matrix containing the variances and covariances
of the losses.
alpha The confidence level at which either the VaR or the ES will be computed, by
default alpha is set to 0.95.
weights A vector of weights of size N for computing both the mean and the variance
of the vector of Losses, it is applicable only when Loss is a vector. When
weights=NULL mean and variaces used to compute ES are the original values
supplied to Losses and varcov.
model A character string indicating which probability model has to be used for com-
puting the risk measures, it could only be a normal distribution or a t-student
distribution with $v$ degrees of freedom. The normal distibution is the default
model for this funcion. model also allows the user to set ’both’ if she wishes
both normal and t-student VaR or ES depending on what she choses in measure.
See example below.
df An integer (df>2) denoting the degrees of freedom, only required if model=’t-
student’. Otherwise it has to be NULL.
Value
A data.frame containing each risk measure at its corresponding confidence level
Author(s)
Jilber Urbina.
References
McNeal A., Frey R. and Embrechts P (2005). Quantitative Risk Management: Concepts, Tech-
niques and Tools. Princeton Series of Finance. ISBN 0-691-12255-5
See Also
Risk
Examples
# Reproducing VaR from Table 2.1 in page 47 of
# McNeal A., Frey R. and Embrechts P (2005).
alpha <- c(.90, .95, .975, .99, .995)
(VaR(Loss=1, varcov=(0.2/sqrt(250))^2, alpha=alpha,
model=’both’, df=4)-1)*10000
# only normal VaR results
(VaR(Loss=1, varcov=(0.2/sqrt(250))^2, alpha=alpha)-1)*10000
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# Same result using
(Risk(Loss=1, varcov=(0.2/sqrt(250))^2, alpha=alpha)-1)*10000
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